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I. Growing Linkages Between Trade and Regulatory Policies
Today, I will present a comprehensive description of the myriad ways in 
which the making of trade and regulatory polices influence one another. I will 
examine how international and regional trade negotiations, agreements, and 
disputes are affecting and being affected by national consumer and environ­
mental regulations. I will then analyze the growing political linkages between 
the formerly distinctive policy areas of trade and protective regulation within 
the European Union, North America and globally. My main theoretical con­
tribution is to link the comparative study of regulatory policy to that of inter­
national political economy. I make this contribution by demonstrating the 
connection among the domestic roots of national regulatory policies and pref­
erences, national political and economic power, and regulatory outcomes.
Trade and regulatory linkages are not new. As long as protective regula­
tions have existed, they have affected trade, either indirectly by influencing the 
composition of imports and exports, or directly by determining the standards 
that imported products must meet. Moreover, the use of regulations as trade 
barriers has a long history. For example, through 1927, the United States had 
enacted about a dozen federal laws that used trade restrictions to advance envi­
ronmental objectives.1 An 1897 statute prohibited the importation of wild 
animals or birds except under permit, while 1905 legislation forbade the im­
portation of pests injurious to crops, forests or "shade trees". The following 
year, the US banned the import of sponges from the Gulf of Mexico that had 
been gathered by methods which harmed the sponge beds. The Underwood 
Tariff of 1913 prohibited the importation of plumes and feathers from speci­
fied wild birds while the Alaska Fisheries Act of 1926 made it unlawful to im­
port salmon caught in ways that violated American fishing regulations.
Food production and processing standards have also long restricted interna­
tional trade. For example, during the latter part of the 19th century, various 
American meats were banned from Italy, France and Germany because of in­
adequate American sanitary standards for meat processing. During the 1930s, 
anxious to protect the American cattle industry, the United States banned all 
imports of Argentine beef following an outbreak of hoof and mouth disease in 
that country. The country-wide ban remained in place even after the disease 
had been confined to a few local areas. Notwithstanding the trade liberalization 
of the post-war period, the use of regulatory standards as trade barriers has 
persisted. Innumerable Japanese product, certification and inspection standards 
have restricted access to the Japanese market. Likewise, European standards 
for products ranging from household appliances to bread, beer and pasta long 
functioned as import barriers within western Europe as well as internationally.
1 This paragraph is based on Steve Chamovitz, "Exploring the Environmental Exceptions 




























































































Yet it is only relatively recently that consumer and environmental regula­
tions have emerged as an important and continuing focus of trade conflicts, 
negotiations and agreements. Why? The increasingly important contemporary 
linkages between trade and protective regulation reflect the convergence of 
four developments: the increase in regional and international efforts to pro­
mote economic integration, the growth in the number of health, safety and 
environmental regulations, the expansion of international trade itself, and the 
rise consumer and environmental organizations as potent political actors.
The seven rounds of GATT negotiations prior to the Uruguay Round re­
duced tariffs by nearly 75 per cent, while they have been eliminated within 
western Europe and are being phased out in North America. Accordingly, the 
relative importance of non-tariff trade barriers, (NTBs) such as health, safety 
and environmental regulation, has increased.
The greater the commitment to economic integration, the more trade 
agreements will intrude upon domestic policies. Efforts to limit the ability of 
protective regulations to restrict trade can thus be seen as part of a broader ef­
fort to address other NTBs such as public sector procurement, the protection 
of property rights and restrictions on direct foreign investment -  each of 
which extends the scope of trade policies and agreements to policy areas that 
were formally controlled exclusively by national governments. Not surpris­
ingly, this chipping away of national sovereignty over environmental and con­
sumer protection policies is most advanced in the EU, whose member states 
have also made the most extensive effort to create a single market. But both 
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round GATT agreement also seek to reduce the role 
of national regulations as NTBs in order to promote trade.
The second development is an increase in health, safety and environmental 
regulations themselves. The last three decades have witnessed a significant ex­
pansion of government regulations which directly affect traded goods. These 
include regulations for automobile emissions; the content and disposal of pack­
aging; chemical safety; the processing, composition and labeling of food; and 
the protection of wildlife and natural resources. The growth of protective 
regulation has frequently forced exporters to cope with a diverse array of 
product standards, while many national regulations, such as those governing 
the shipment of hazardous waste or recycling, are inherently trade restrictive. 
While in general national regulatory standards have become stronger, espe­
cially among the developed nations among whom most world trade and in­
vestment occurs, nations continue to vary in their regulatory goals and in their 
specific means of achieving them. Since nations generally want to maintain 
their own standards in spite of -  or sometimes because of -  the burdens they 
impose on imports, the continual growth of national regulatory standards rep­




























































































Not only has the amount of protective regulation steadily increased, but 
during the second half of the 1980s its scope broadened as well. A distinctive 
feature of many of the environmental issues that emerged during the 1980s 
was their global dimension. The protection of endangered species located in 
different countries or in international waters, the protection of the ozone 
layer, the reduction of environmental damage associated with the shipment and 
disposal of hazardous waste and the preservation of tropical forests in less de­
veloped nations, all require nations to coordinate their regulatory policies. 
And this coordination often includes restrictions on trade, either as a means of 
preventing "free-riding" or because the harm itself is trade-related.
The disparity in national regulatory standards, especially between rich and 
poor nations, has affected trade policies in another way: it has increased na­
tional differences in the costs of producing goods. Although these differences 
have had little measurable impact on patterns of international trade and in­
vestment, nonetheless many environmentalists worry that producers in nations 
with relatively strict standards will attempt to exploit these disparities in na­
tional regulatory standards by demanding that regulations be relaxed in order 
to enable them to remain competitive. Accordingly, they want international 
trade agreements to play a more active role in harmonizing national regula­
tions, especially in the area of environmental protection. Not surprisingly, 
their proposals to "green the GATT" have been strongly opposed by less de­
veloped countries who fear the loss of export markets.
Thirdly, the nearly sixty-fold expansion of international trade since 1950 
has itself significantly affected public health, safety and the physical environ­
ment. In a number of respects, this expansion has improved environmental 
quality: it has promoted the dissemination of improved environmental tech­
nologies and encouraged the more efficient use of resources. Moreover, by in­
creasing growth rates, it has made possible increased expenditures to improve 
environmental quality and expanded the market for "greener" products. Envi­
ronmental quality in wealthier nations is measurably better than in poorer 
ones.2
But international trade has also exacerbated a number of environmental 
problems. In particular, the expansion of trade directly causes environmental 
damage; not only is the increased transportation of goods an important cause 
of pollution, but some goods shipped across national boundaries are inherently 
harmful, such as hazardous wastes. The expansion of international trade has 
also made it more difficult for governments to protect the health of their citi­
zens, who are increasingly consuming goods produced in other countries. This 
is an especially serious problem with respect to agricultural products, always a
2 According to a study by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, “environmental quality tends 
to improve as a nation’s per capita gross domestic product approaches $8,000 in 1985 
dollars on a purchasing-power basis.” Gene Koretz, “A Robust Economy Can Help Cure 




























































































politically sensitive area. The nearly tenfold expansion of international trade in 
food between 1962 and 1993 has made the health of consumers much more 
dependent on the agricultural production and inspection practices of their na­
tion's trading partners.
Moreover, as tariffs have declined and trade has increased, domestic regula­
tory policies are more likely to have international economic impacts. For ex­
ample, in a relatively isolated domestic economy, a recycling regulation that 
encourages the use of bottles and discourages the use of cans makes domestic 
glass producers better off at the expense of domestic can manufacturers. But if 
both these commodities are freely traded, then this same regulation is also 
likely to affect the market share of producers in different nations. If foreign 
can producers have been disadvantaged, they will then complain to their gov­
ernments, who in turn may challenge the recycling requirement as a trade 
barrier. The recycling requirement will, of course, be defended by both do­
mestic bottle producers and environmentalists. Thus the expansion of trade has 
itself made regulations into a more important source of trade conflicts.
Fourth and finally, a new set of constituencies, namely consumer and envi­
ronmental organizations, have become active participants in the making of 
trade policy. Unlike producers or workers, these non-governmental organiza­
tions (NGOs) are interested not in the economic impact of trade policies, but 
rather in the way they affect consumer health and safety and environmental 
quality in their own countries, and often in others as well. In many cases, 
NGOs have transferred their suspicion of domestic markets to global ones. 
Alliances between protectionist producers and NGOs have become common­
place in the United States, western Europe, and Japan, and these coalitions rep­
resent an increasingly important source of opposition to trade liberalization.
The increasing importance of trade and regulatory linkages is reflected in 
the evolution of international treaties and trade agreements. Neither the origi­
nal 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade nor the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome which established the European Economic Community mentions the 
word "environment." By contrast, the 1987 Single European Act explicitly ad­
dresses the relationship between the creation of the single market and Euro­
pean environmental standards, as does the Maastricht Treaty.
While the 1979 Tokyo Round GATT negotiations did address the role of 
technical standards as nontariff barriers through the Standards Code, the latter 
was not made part of the General Agreement itself; compliance remained vol­
untary. However, the Uruguay Round GATT agreement both expanded the 
scope of the Standards Code and incorporated it into the provisions of the 




























































































health and environmental standards are finally being reigned in."3 Finally the 
1994 North American Free Trade Agreement among the United States, Mex­
ico and Canada, unlike the Free Trade Agreement between the United States 
and Canada which went into effect six years earlier, includes a Supplementary 
Agreement on the Environment. Thus, while conflicts between trade and regu­
lation are becoming both more numerous and more important, the policy goals 
of liberal trade and more effective protective regulations are not incompatible. 
In this talk, I will demonstrate that trade liberalization and agreements to 
promote it, rather than undermining effective regulatory standards, have in a 
number of cases served to strengthen them. This phenomenon, which is called 
the "California effect," will be explored in detail later in this talk.
The Internationalization of Regulation
Protective regulations are important for three reasons. Most obviously, they 
represent efforts to achieve a number of important public goals, such as pro­
tecting public health and improving environmental quality. Secondly, protec­
tive regulations have important macro-economic consequences; they affect na­
tional rates of productivity growth, price and investment levels, and wage 
rates. Thirdly, they politicize economic competition. Regulations rarely affect 
all firms equally; they usually make some better off and some worse off rela­
tive to their competitors. "This simple fact is at the heart of the Iron Law and 
Public Policy: while government action may increase the costs of doing busi­
ness, these cost increases are not the same for all competitors ... differential 
costs of regulatory compliance can -  and do -  affect the competitiveness of 
individual firms."4 Accordingly, firms often participate in the regulatory pro­
cess in order to gain competitive advantages, or to resist the efforts of their 
competitors to do so.
Each of these three critical components of the regulatory process has an in­
creasingly important international dimension. To begin with, many national 
regulatory policies also affect the health and welfare of other countries, or 
even the entire globe, thus blurring the distinction between domestic and in­
ternational regulatory policies. Secondly, to the extent that national regulations 
affect the volume and composition of world trade, they influence the perfor­
mance of the global as well as the domestic economy. Thirdly, many national 
regulations, especially for traded goods, affect not only the competitive posi­
tion of firms within a country, but also between or among different countries. 
"Regulation is as much a tool of statecraft as military defenses ever were ...
3 Sieve Chamovitz, “The World Trade Organization and Environmental Supervision,” 
International Environmenta Reporter 17, no. 2, (January 26,1994): 92.
4 Robert A. Leone, Who Profits? Winners, Losers, and Government Regulation New 




























































































the logic of state regulation is in part the logic of conflict."5 Because national 
protective regulations often represent important sources of competitive advan­
tage and disadvantage for firms competing in the global marketplace, national 
regulations also affect international competition and competitiveness.
For these reasons, the rules established by international institutions, treaties 
and agreements that seek to govern the impact of national regulations on trade 
play a critical role in mediating between the domestic and international econ­
omy. They help determine the conditions under which both producers and 
non-governmental organizations are able to influence the regulatory policies 
of their trading partners.
What Is A Nontariff Barrier?
The definition of a nontariff barrier is critical to understanding the rela­
tionship between regulation and trade. Tariffs, by definition, distinguish be­
tween imported and domestic goods: a tariff is a product tax that only applies 
to imports. Many of the most economically important nontariff barriers also 
discriminate explicitly on the basis of the national origin of products or firms. 
These include quotas, "voluntary" import and export controls, restrictions on 
foreign investment, and public procurement policies that favor domestic firms. 
By contrast, relatively few environmental and consumer regulations explicitly 
distinguish between producers or products on the basis of national origin. At 
least on the surface, most do not violate the key principle of free trade, which 
is non-discrimination or "national treatment." However, many of these regula­
tions do have the effect of creating barriers or obstacles to imports. But does 
this automatically make them nontariff barriers? How can trade agreements 
and treaties distinguish between necessary and unnecessary obstacles to trade? 
The answer to this question is essentially a political one.
An analogy can be made to the ongoing debate over the interpretation of 
American civil rights laws. Should only those laws or policies that explicitly 
distinguish among individuals on the basis of their race be considered discrim­
inatory? Or should a law or policy also be defined as discriminatory if it has 
the effect of disadvantaging a particular group of people? Broadening the 
definition of a nontariff barrier represents an effort by supporters of trade 
liberalization to reduce the disadvantages currently experienced by many for­
eign producers in the same way that broadening the definition of discrimina­
tion represents an effort by civil rights activists to remedy the disadvantages 
experienced by various racial minorities.





























































































And just as the definition of discrimination has important implications for 
the way American civil rights laws are enforced, so does the definition of a 
nontariff barrier have important consequences for both trade and regulatory 
policies. Proponents of trade liberalization tend to define NTBs relatively 
broadly, while proponents of stricter regulatory standards want them defined 
more narrowly. The former want to strengthen the ability of producers to 
challenge the regulatory policies of their trading partners, while the latter 
want to preserve the ability of nations with stricter standards to maintain them 
and, in some cases, impose them on their trading partners as well.
Consider the following extreme positions: if all regulations that disadvan­
taged importers were classified as nontariff barriers, then virtually all regula­
tions could be considered protectionist. For example, the United States could 
not require that all product labels be printed in English, since this requirement 
clearly imposes additional costs upon foreign producers, (or at least those 
from non-English speaking countries.) Likewise, Singapore would be forced 
to rescind its ban on the sale of chewing gum, since this regulation clearly 
serves as a barrier to the import of Wrigley's products. In short, defining 
NTBs very broadly would have the effect of subjecting virtually all national 
regulatory standards to those of the least stringent exporting country. At the 
same time it would probably significantly expand international trade.
The consequences of defining nontariff barriers very narrowly are equally 
significant. A nation could demand that all imported products be produced ac­
cording to the same standards to which domestic producers are required to ad­
here. Thus the European Union could refuse to permit the imports of any cars, 
steel or chemicals produced in facilities that violated EU standards for factory 
emissions, land-use controls, or, for that matter, family leave policies. If such 
a regulation were not considered a nontariff barrier, and were widely adopted, 
international trade would decline significantly. On the other hand, many na­
tions might be to forced to upgrade their regulatory standards to match those 
prevailing in countries to whose markets they wanted access.
Few would consider the first group of regulations to be nontariff barriers, 
while most would consider the latter to be. However, none of these hypotheti­
cal examples explicitly discriminates between imported and domestic products; 
they hold both to identical standards. But where then should treaties and trade 
agreements draw the line? How should they distinguish between protective 
regulations that are actually disguised trade barriers and protective regulations 
which may have the same effect as disguised trade barriers, but which 
nonetheless are necessary to protect the public's health, safety and the physical 
environment? In other words, how can international institutions and trade 
agreements permit or promote environmental and consumer protection while 




























































































The range of responses to these questions comprises much of the current 
debate over the impact of trade agreements and regulatory standards on one 
another. Different trade agreements answer these questions differently, and 
their answers have changed over time. Consider the following actual regula­
tions, each of which led to a major trade dispute under an international agree­
ment or treaty:
- A German regulation bans the sale of liqueur with an alcoholic content of 
less than 25 per cent. (Treaty of Rome)
- A regulation by the Canadian Province of Ontario imposes a 10 cent tax 
on beer sold in cans. (FTA)
- An American regulation prohibits the sale of tuna fish caught in ways that 
also kill large numbers of dolphins. (GATT)
- An EU regulation bans the sale of beef from cattle which have been fed 
growth hormones. (GATT Standards Code)
Each of these regulations has two things in common: they do not discrimi­
nate on the basis of national origin and they do impose greater burdens on 
some importers. Specifically, these regulations disadvantaged producers of 
French liqueur, whose product had a low alcoholic content; American beer 
brewers, who shipped beer to Canada in cans because of transportation costs; 
Mexican tuna fishermen, whose fishing techniques and geography caused more 
dolphin deaths than American fishermen; and American cattlemen, who rely 
heavily on hormones to produce meat and meat products. Correspondingly, 
these regulations benefited German liquor producers, whose product contained 
a higher alcoholic content; Canadian brewers, who produced beer in bottles; 
American tuna fishermen, who had adopted fishing methods that reduced dol­
phin mortality; and European cattle farmers and beef producers, whose beef 
and beef products were produced without hormones.
In each case, the issue was not whether these regulations interfered with 
trade. It was rather the extent to which their interference was necessary to 
achieve a legitimate domestic policy objective. Thus the Germans claimed that 
their alcoholic content regulation helped prevent German consumers from de­
veloping an increased tolerance for alcohol; the Canadians argued that their 
tax promoted the use and reuse of glass containers, which both reduced litter­
ing and saved energy; the Americans contended that their restrictions on sales 
of "dolphin-unfriendly" tuna were necessary to protect the lives of intelligent 
marine mammals; and the EU justified its hormone ban on the grounds of con­




























































































These and similar trade disputes have often led to a heated debate regarding 
the criteria for classifying regulations as nontariff barriers. This debate has 
revolved around a number of issues.
First, what standards of scientific proof should be required to justify a 
regulation that interferes with trade? In the case of the EU hormone ban, 
should the EU be obligated to prove that the consumption of meat from cattle 
which have been fed hormones is unsafe, or must the United States prove that 
meat from hormone-fed cattle is safe? In other words, what makes a regula­
tion that restricts trade "necessary?" And on whom does the burden of proof 
of demonstrating that it necessary or unnecessary fall? Many protective 
regulations make no demonstrable contribution to either consumer or envi­
ronmental protection, and they therefore can readily be rescinded or revised 
without adversely affecting public health or environmental quality. But in 
many other cases, there is legitimate disagreement as to whether a regulation 
actually is necessary to protect public health or environmental quality.
Secondly, should the intention behind a regulation affect whether it is con­
sidered a nontariff barrier? While each of these regulations did benefit do­
mestic producers, that was not necessarily the only or even the primary reason 
they were adopted. In the case of the American ban on imports of tuna from 
Mexico, American tuna fishermen neither asked for nor required import pro­
tection, since dolphin-safe tuna already commanded a substantial premium in 
the American market. The ban on tuna imports from Mexico came about as a 
result of a lawsuit filed by an American environmental organization. On the 
other hand, Ontario's beer can tax was strongly backed by that province’s beer 
bottlers as part of their long-standing effort to restrict imports of American 
beer, though it was supported by Canadian environmentalists as well.
In both the tuna and beer cases, the American position was that the purpose 
behind the regulation did matter. Based on this criterion, the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act was not a nontariff barrier because its primary objective was to 
protect dolphins, while the Ontario tax was because its primary purpose was to 
protect the local beer bottling industry -  as evidenced by the fact that the tax 
on cans did not extend to either soft drinks or food. Not surprisingly, their 
trading partners argued that the objectives of the regulations were not relevant 
for assessing their status as nontariff barriers. While some regulations are 
simply disguised forms of protectionism, in many cases the motives behind a 
particular regulatory policy are complex. Thus the EU's ban on the use of 
growth hormones was intended to protect small, inefficient farmers as well as 
European consumers.
Thirdly, in enacting a regulation that affects trade, is a nation obligated to 
select the method of regulation that least restricts it? Thus if the United States 
could demonstrate that Ontario could accomplish the goals of its recycling 




























































































does the tax on cans then constitute a nontariff barrier? Or is Ontario only ob­
ligated to demonstrate that its regulation is effective in achieving its goals? 
Similarly, if the United States could demonstrate that the health of European 
consumers could be adequately protected by a labeling requirement, does the 
EU ban then constitute an illegitimate interference with trade?
Fourth, should a nation be allowed to restrict the sale of a product on the 
basis of how it was produced outside its legal jurisdiction? Or is a nation only 
permitted to impose regulations on imports in order to protect its citizens or 
domestic environment? In other words, must a nation only hold imported 
products to the same standards as domestically produced ones, or can it also 
restrict or tax an imported product on the basis of how it was produced, i.e., 
harvested, extracted, manufactured or shipped, by the citizens of another 
country?
This question was a central point of contention in the tuna/dolphin dispute 
between the United States and Mexico. On one hand, the tuna sold to American 
consumers that were caught by foreign fishing vessels using methods that also 
killed dolphins were identical in every respect to the tuna caught using dol­
phin-safe methods. On the other hand, the tuna differed in terms of the impact 
of their production methods on dolphin mortality. In its complaint against the 
United States, Mexico argued that the American regulation constituted an il­
legitimate interference with the domestic policies of a sovereign state; it 
claimed that the United States should not be permitted to restrict the imports 
of products from countries whose ways of producing them differed from its 
own. The United States in turn countered that its tuna processing standard was 
necessary to fulfill a legitimate conservation objective of the United States, 
namely dolphin protection. Accordingly, the nationality of the fishing vessels 
that injured dolphins was irrelevant.
Outcomes and Significance
These four trade disputes were brought under four different trade treaties 
and agreements and this affected the way they were resolved. The German 
liqueur regulation was struck down by the European Court of Justice in Cassis 
de Dijon on the grounds that it was not needed to protect Germany consumers, 
the Canadian beer can tax was allowed to stand under the Free Trade Agree­
ment between the United States and Canada, the American ban on imports of 
Mexican tuna was judged by a GATT dispute settlement panel to be inconsis­
tent with American obligations under the General Agreement, and the EC 
hormone ban stands in part because the EC refused to submit it to dispute set­
tlement procedures under the GATT Standards Code.
Not only do international institutions and agreements define nontariff barri­




























































































panel ruling in the tuna/dolphin case is the most controversial case in the 
nearly forty year history of the General Agreement. It led environmentalists 
to demand a revision of GATT rules to permit nations to restrict imports pro­
duced in ways that harm the environment -  especially the global commons. 
This proposal in turn alarmed many less developed countries, as well as GAIT 
officials, who feared that it would legitimate eco-protectionism. While this is­
sue was not addressed in the Uruguay Round, it will be high on the agenda of 
next round of trade negotiations to be conducted under the auspices of the 
newly established World Trade Organization.
However, the Uruguay Round agreement, while not addressing the issues 
raised by the tuna/dolphin dispute, did address one of the critical issues raised 
by the EC hormone ban. The Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Stan­
dards, which is now part of the GATT, limits the ability of signatories to use 
health protection measures in the areas of food safety and agriculture, as trade 
barriers. If a nation's standards are stricter than those established by the Codex 
Alimentarius, an international standards setting body established under the 
auspices of the United Nations, it must demonstrate that they are both neces­
sary to protect the health of its citizens and that its standards interfere with 
trade as little as possible.
Cassis (1979) also had an important impact on trade policy. One of the most 
important cases ever decided by the ECJ, Cassis defined as a trade barrier any 
national regulation that has the effect of making imports from another mem­
ber more costly. It then established the critical principle of mutual recogni­
tion: no member state of the Community can restrict the sale of a product law­
fully produced and marketed in another member state, unless it can demon­
strate that the imported product threatens the health of its citizens. Further­
more, in enacting regulations to protect consumers, nations must select the 
means of doing so that least interfere with trade. The ECJ ruled against Ger­
many because there was no evidence that Cassis threatened the health of Ger­
man consumers. Moreover, the legitimate interests of German consumers 
could be equally protected by a labeling requirement, which was also less trade 
restrictive. By freeing the EC from the need to harmonize literally thousands 
of national regulations, Cassis significantly contributed to European integra­
tion; the concept of mutual recognition helped make possible the passage of the 
Single European Act and the EC's 1992 program.
Regulations and Trade Agreements
The concept of "proportionality" has frequently been employed to assess the 
legitimacy or legality of a regulation which restricts trade. This approach 
subjects national regulations that hamper the free movement of goods to a 
"balancing" or minimum-means test: it requires nations to select the means of 




























































































with the free movement of goods. Accordingly, the benefits of a regulation 
must be weighed against the burdens it imposes on international commerce. 
This approach has been employed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
to interpret the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution and the Euro­
pean Court of Justice to interpret the Treaty of Rome and the Single European 
Act; variants of it have been incorporated into the texts of both NAFTA and 
the Uruguay Round GATT agreement which established the WTO.
Proportionality can be regarded as the international application of cost-ben­
efit analysis, which governments have frequently employed to assess the value 
or legality of domestic health, safety and environmental laws. Both concepts 
seek to judge the value of a regulation by balancing its goals with its costs: 
cost-benefit analysis focuses on the costs of compliance to the domestic econ­
omy, proportionality on its costs to foreign producers and thus indirectly to 
domestic consumers as well.
Like cost-benefit analysis, the concept of proportionality is often difficult to 
apply in practice. For while the burdens imposed by a regulation on importers 
are readily apparent, assessing the value of a consumer or environmental regu­
lation to the citizenry of the nation which enacted it often involves a more 
subjective judgement. How safe should processed beef be? How much recy­
cling is necessary? How much protection should dolphins be accorded? And 
how much of a burden on commerce is each worth?
Since there is rarely a consensus on the answers to these questions within 
nations, it is not surprising that there has often been substantial disagreement 
among the governments, firms and citizens of different countries. Many trade 
disputes reflect the different values nations attach to different policy objectives 
as well as their willingness to interfere with markets to achieve them. As 
Martin Shapiro writes in connection with the European Community: "There is 
simply no objective way of weighing the two pounds of reduced cancer risk to 
Frenchmen against the eight pounds of salami that Italy is blocked from selling 
to France. Proportionality is by its very nature in the eye of the beholder."6
These four examples also illustrate the kinds of consumer and environmen­
tal regulations that have frequently become the focus of trade disputes. Differ­
ences among national regulations for food label, processing and composition 
represent a particularly important source of trade friction both within the EU 
and globally. National conservation policies in general and recycling require­
ments in particular are becoming an increasingly important source of trade 
conflicts within both the EU and North America. Finally, a number of trade 
disputes, such as the tuna/dolphin case, stem from the efforts of "greener" 
governments to make access to their domestic markets contingent upon
6 Martin Shapiro, "The European Court of Justice," in Euro-Politics, ed. Alberta Sbragia, 




























































































changes in the environmental practices of their trading partners. Many, but by 
no means all, of these disputes pit developed against undeveloped nations.
Baptists and Bootleggers
One important consequence of the growing linkages between trade and 
regulatory policies has been to create additional opportunities for alliances 
between producers and environmental and consumer organizations, or "Baptist 
- bootlegger" coalitions.7 This phrase comes from the study of politics of 
prohibition in the United States: political support for keeping certain Southern 
counties "dry" has come from both Baptists, who favor prohibition on moral 
grounds, and bootleggers, whose business depends on keeping alcohol sales il­
legal. Prohibition not only affects public morality but the market shares of 
legitimate and illegal alcoholic beverage producers and distributors. The battle 
over the rules governing the sale of alcoholic beverages thus has to do with 
both morality and markets.
Baptist-bootlegger alliances have long been a staple of domestic regulatory 
policy-making. For example, during the battle over the 1977 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, both environmentalists and eastern coal producers supported 
sulphur emission regulations that disadvantaged western coal companies. They 
have also, on occasion, affected regulatory and trade policies. The passage of 
the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1906 was due to the combined efforts of 
American consumers, who were outraged by the meat processing practices 
they learned about from reading Sinclair's The Jungle, and large American 
meat processing firms, who wanted stricter federal meat inspection in order to 
convince the Europeans to reopen their markets -  an early example of the role 
of international trade in strengthening product standards for traded goods.8
Some protective regulations disadvantage domestic producers vis-a-vis 
their international competitors who don't face the same regulations. This is 
most likely to occur in the case of production standards which may raise the 
relative costs of producing goods or harvesting crops and natural resources. 
These regulations present domestic producers with two political choices: they 
can either demand that the regulations be relaxed, or they can seek to impose 
them on their foreign competitors through international agreements or import 
restrictions.
7 This phrase was by coined by Bruce Yandle, "Bootleggers and Baptists," Regulation 7 
(May/June 1982): 12-16.
8 For an account of the enactment of this law, see Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph o f 
Conservatism, Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1963, pp. 99-108. For Kolko, the 
support of beef processors for federal meat inspection reveals that this legislation was not 




























































































If they choose the first strategy, environmental and consumer groups will 
oppose them; this is the classic pattern of much of domestic regulatory politics. 
But if they choose either of the second alternatives, they are likely to be sup­
ported by NGOs. The latter have tended to be sympathetic to the arguments of 
domestic producers that it is "unfair" for them to be forced to compete with 
foreign competitors who are subject to less stringent production standards. 
Moreover, environmental organizations often support the use of trade restric­
tions as a way of pressuring other countries to strengthen their regulatory 
standards.
However, many protective regulations make domestic producers better off 
vis-a-vis their foreign competitors, since they are more readily able to comply 
with them; this is most likely to occur in the case of product standards. In this 
case, domestic producers and NGOs also have similar interests. Both want to 
defend domestic product regulations that also serve as obstacles to importers. 
Consequently, many trade disputes over regulatory issues pit coalitions of 
NGOs and domestic producers against foreign producers.
For producers who wish to maintain or increase trade barriers, the conver­
gence of trade and regulatory policies provides them with two significant po­
litical benefits. First, it furnishes them with an argument for trade restrictions 
which has relatively wide political appeal: consumer or environmental protec­
tion. They can argue against the removal of trade barriers on similar grounds. 
Secondly, it provides them with an important new source of political support 
as consumer and environmental organizations enjoy considerable political in­
fluence in a number of capitalist nations.
At the same time, the convergence of trade and regulatory policies also 
provides an important political benefit for environmental and consumer orga­
nizations: it provides them with allies from the business community in their ef­
fort to promote stricter regulatory standards. Domestic producers are more 
likely to support more stringent regulations if the costs of complying with 
them fall disproportionately on their international competitors, or if they can 
be imposed on foreign producers as well. In short, "Baptist-bootlegger" coali­
tions can not only increase bootleggers' profits, they can also save Baptists' 
souls.
The "California Effect"
Agreements and treaties to promote liberal trade policies have contributed 
to limiting the role of national regulations as trade barriers. And their author­
ity over national regulatory standards is increasing. But thanks in part to Bap­
tist - bootlegger alliances, trade liberalization can just as easily be achieved by 
forcing nations with lower standards to raise them as by forcing nations with 




























































































has been more common than the latter. To the extent that trade liberalization 
has affected the level of consumer and environmental protection, it has more 
often strengthened than weakened it. There is, however, nothing automatic 
about this process. The impact of trade liberalization on regulatory standards 
is primarily dependent on die preferences of wealthy, powerful states, and the 
degree of economic integration among them and their trading partners.
The notion that economic competition among political jurisdictions will lead 
to a regulatory "race to the bottom" has been labeled the "Delaware effect." 
This derives from the experience of the United States with corporate charter­
ing.9 Because corporate charters are given by an individual state and all states 
are legally required to recognize the legitimacy of each others' charters (an 
American version of mutual recognition), states have tended to compete with 
each other by liberalizing their chartering requirements. The state which has 
been most successful in this competition has been Delaware, whose corporate 
chartering law is generally considered the most responsive to the interests of 
management.
However, I will demonstrate that regulatory competition can lead to a 
rather different outcome. A number of national patterns of health, safety and 
environmental regulation illustrate the "California effect," named for the state 
that has been on the cutting edge of environmental regulation, both nationally 
and globally, for nearly three decades. 1° The "California effect" is meant to 
convey the critical role of powerful and wealthy, "green" political jurisdic­
tions in promoting a regulatory "race to the top" among their trading partners. 
Thus just as California's relative size and wealth within the American economy 
has helped drive many American environmental regulations upward, so has 
Germany, the EU's largest and wealthiest member state, contributed to the 
strengthening of the European Union's regulatory standards. Globally and re­
gionally, this role has been played primarily by the world's two largest mar­
kets, namely the United States and the European Union.
The "Delaware effect" assumes stricter standards represent a source of 
competitive disadvantage. But, in contrast to labor standards, the costs of 
complying with stricter consumer and environmental standards has not been 
sufficiently large enough to force political jurisdictions to lower their stan­
dards in order to keep domestic firms or plants competitive. On the contrary: 
in the case of many environmental and consumer regulations, stricter stan­
dards represent a source of competitive advantage for domestic producers, in 
part because it is often easier for them to comply with them. Hence they often
9 William L. Cary, "Federalism and corporate law: reflections upon Delaware,” Yale Law 
Journal 83 (1974): 663-705. In fact, students of corporate law disagree as to whether 
Delaware's standards for corporate chartering are actually weaker. I use "the Delaware ef­
fect" as a metaphor.
See "California Sunshine" in Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold (Boston: Beacon 




























































































compete with firms from other political jurisdictions by raising standards 
rather than lowering them.
Equally significantly, when rich nations with large domestic markets such as 
the United States and Germany enact stricter product standards, their trading 
partners find themselves under pressure to meet them in order to maintain 
market access. This in turn often encourages consumer or environmental or­
ganizations in the exporting country to demand similar standards for products 
sold in their domestic markets -  a demand that internationally oriented pro­
ducers are now more willing to support since their exports to "greener" mar­
kets already meet them.
Thus the disparity in national regulations is not only an ongoing source of 
trade tensions; it also represents a mechanism by which national product stan­
dards can be driven upward. However, the role of "greener" markets in rais­
ing the regulatory standards of the nations with whom they trade is primarily 
confined to product standards. Trade liberalization, by itself, is less likely to 
strengthen domestic regulations governing how goods and natural resources 
are produced.
The impact of trade liberalization on regulatory standards is also affected 
by another factor: the degree of economic integration. The stronger the role 
of international institutions in promoting liberal trade policies, the more ex­
tensive the leverage of rich, powerful states over the regulatory powers of 
their trading partners. Thus it is precisely the EU's commitment to the cre­
ation of a single European market that has enabled Germany and its influential 
green pressure groups to exercise so much influence over the environmental 
policies of other member states. By contrast, because the GATT is a much 
weaker institution, the ability of a "greener" nation like the United States to af­
fect the domestic regulatory policies of its trading partners has been much 
more limited. Unlike the EU, neither the GATT nor the newly established 
WTO contains any mechanisms for enabling its most powerful members to 
strengthen the regulatory standards of other signatories.
NAFTA falls roughly in between. Like the EU, it subjects national envi­
ronmental standards to extra-national scrutiny: a nation can be disciplined ei­
ther for not enforcing existing regulatory standards or for lowering them to 
attract investment. But compared to the EU, the institutions established by 
NAFTA have much less authority to harmonize regulatory standards within 
North America; NAFTA is essentially a trade agreement, albeit a relatively 
"green" one. It thus provides the United States with more opportunity to affect 
Mexican regulatory policies than America had under the GATT, but less than 
Germany has been able to exercise within the EU.
But it is important not to equate stricter standards with more effective regu­




























































































nothing to enhancing consumer or environmental protection. To the extent that 
these regulations have been successfully challenged through trade agreements 
and treaties, public welfare has been enhanced. However efforts to remove 
trade barriers to promote economic integration have at times prevented 
"greener" nations from establishing regulations as strict as its citizens and pro­
ducers would prefer. This talk describes a number of such cases, primarily 
within the EU, but within the GATT has well.
At the same time, trade liberalization has also helped increase the leverage 
of NGOs and producers in "greener" countries over the regulatory policies of 
their trading partners. Thus the EU has significantly strengthened Germany's 
ability to shape the regulatory standards of Greece and Italy. A similar dy­
namic is likely to occur, albeit less dramatically, in North America. As a result 
of NAFTA, Mexican regulatory standards and their enforcement increasingly 
will be shaped by the preferences and influence of American producers and 
NGOs. Indeed, this has already occurred: American environmental organiza­
tions forced Mexico to strengthen both its environmental regulations and their 
enforcement as a condition for supporting trade liberalization.
Trade liberalization is most likely to strengthen consumer and environmen­
tal protection when a group of nations has agreed to reduce the role of regula­
tions as trade barriers and the most powerful among them has influential do­
mestic constituencies that support stronger regulatory standards. Thus the 
stronger the commitment of nations to coordinate their regulatory policies, the 
more powerful is the "California effect." Likewise, the weaker the institutions 
created by regional or international trade agreements or treaties, the weaker 
the "California effect." Accordingly, the "California effect" has been relatively 
important within the EU and much less important within the GATT, with 




























































































II. The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Regulatory Standards
The tensions between protective regulation and free trade described in this 
talk might be leading to one of two outcomes: either free trade or protective 
regulation would triumph at the expense of the other. According to one sce­
nario, trade liberalization might be steadily undermining national regulatory 
standards. Finding that the costs of compliance with the strict standards de­
manded by their citizens had made their products uncompetitive on global 
markets, and no longer able to protect their industries by tariffs, national gov­
ernments would be forced to progressively weaken their consumer and envi­
ronmental regulations. Their competitors would then respond by lowering 
their standards still further, thus producing a downward spiral of regulatory 
standards. Likewise, the increasingly powerful international institutions estab­
lished by trade agreements and treaties would have become progressively 
more vigilant in their scrutiny of protective regulations that "interfered" with 
trade, thus inhibiting many nations from enforcing regulatory standards 
stricter than those of their trading partners. Consequently, the influence of 
consumer and environmental organizations over regulatory policies would be 
declining.
Alternatively, precisely the opposite outcome might be taking place. Nations 
would be enacting an increasing number of regulatory standards that disadvan­
taged importers, including making access to their domestic markets contingent 
upon other nations adopting production standards similar to their own. Dispute 
settlement mechanisms would have become toothless in the face of these eco- 
protectionist challenges to trade liberalization. Correspondingly, protectionist 
producers and environmental and consumer groups would have increased their 
political influence over both trade and regulatory policies.
A number of the developments described in this talk are consistent with 
each of these scenarios. In some cases, increased international scrutiny of do­
mestic regulatory policies has expanded, while in others international institu­
tions have proven unable or unwilling to exert effective discipline over na­
tional regulatory standards that restrict trade. The decisions of the GATT dis­
pute panels in the dolphin/tuna cases, the GATT's success in preventing re­
strictions on imports of hardwoods from South Asia, and the EU's Luxem­
bourg and food additive directives illustrate the role of trade agreements in 
weakening national regulations, while Ontario's beer can tax, Denmark's re­
cycling law, the American restrictions on sales of under-sized lobsters, the in­
ability of the EU to harmonize the recycling requirements of its member 
states, and the EU's hormone ban demonstrate the increasing role of regula­
tions as nontariff barriers.
Clearly there are important conflicts between trade and regulatory policies. 
The number and significance of these conflicts will undoubtedly increase as a 




























































































one hand and the continued disparity of national consumer and environmental 
regulations on the other. But there exists a broader and rather counter-intu­
itive pattern. True, the steady growth of regulation has interfered with trade 
while trade agreements are increasingly interfering with regulation. But what 
is more significant is that, on balance, economic integration has increased 
while consumer and environmental standards have become stronger. Given the 
reasonable expectation that the strengthening of one should result in the weak­
ening of the other, what has made this non zero-sum outcome possible?
The Impact of Regulation on Trade
National and, in the case of the EU, regional environmental and consumer 
regulations do continue to represent important obstacles to trade. It is likely 
that in the absence of the substantial expansion of health, safety and environ­
mental regulation over the last three decades, the current level of both re­
gional and international trade would be greater. In addition, the growing par­
ticipation of consumer and environmental organizations in the making of trade 
policies has increased political support for producers who oppose trade lib­
eralization. However the impact of both developments on liberal trade policies 
has been limited by three factors: the political influence of internationally-ori­
ented producers, the commitments of institutions to trade liberalization, and 
the ability of states to agree on common rules to curb trade in as well as the 
production of collective "bads."
First, producers who operate in many markets have a strong interest in 
making national product standards more similar.1! "Uniform product stan­
dards reduce the cost of adopting production runs at a lower unit cost."1 2 For 
this reason, agreements reducing the disparity of regulatory standards for the 
production and marketing of chemicals, automobile emissions, and health 
protection measures for agricultural products has been strongly supported by 
the export-oriented producers in these sectors. Correspondingly, the reduction 
of nontariff barriers in these sectors constitutes a political defeat for more 
domestically-oriented producers for whom distinctive national product stan­
dards represented a way of restricting imports.
11 Helen Milner employs a similar argument to explain business support for liberal trade 
policies during the 1970s and 80s. See Helen Milner, Resisting Protectionism; Global 
Industries and the Politics of International Trade Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988. For an analysis of the role of industrial structures in explaining patterns of interna­
tional regulatory convergence, see Dale Murphy, "Open Economies' Competition for 
Comparative Advantage," MIT Center for International Studies, November 1993, un­
published paper.
12 Charles Pearson, "Environmental Standards, Industrial Relocation, and Pollution 
Havens," in Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World Charles 




























































































This dynamic helps explain not only the important decision of the European 
Community to harmonize emission requirements for automobiles in the late 
1980s, but why the harmonized standards the EU selected were the ones pre­
ferred by Europe's most export-oriented producers, namely the German man­
ufacturers of medium and large cars. These standards not only made it easier 
for German manufacturers to sell their vehicles throughout the EU, but 
equally importantly, because these standards were similar to those of one of 
their major export markets, they enabled the Germans to produce vehicles for 
sale in the United States without major design changes.
The power and preferences of internationally-oriented producers also ac­
counts for both the EU's relatively rapid progress in harmonizing regulations 
for the marketing of chemicals within Europe as well as the subsequent 
agreement between the EU and the United States to harmonize their respective 
testing procedures for chemicals under the auspices of the OECD. None of the 
major chemical producers in Germany, Britain or the United States stood to 
benefit by national regulations that restricted trade. On the contrary, all had a 
common stake in assuring access to each others' market. As one study of 
chemical regulation in the United States and Europe notes, "the global integra­
tion of chemical markets cautions governments against imposing regulatory 
burdens that would ... throw up harmful barriers to trade."13
The influence of producers also played a critical role in the EU's success in 
reducing nontariff barriers to trade in food and food processing. This effort 
has been strongly supported by Europe's export-oriented food producers, pro­
cessors and distributors, all of whom hoped to benefit by the removal of na­
tional regulatory barriers to trade in animals, plants, food and beverages. The 
same dynamic accounts for the decision to restrict the use of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures as nontariff trade barriers in the Uruguay Round 
GATT agreement. The initial pressure for incorporating an agreement on 
S&P standards into the GATT came from American grain processors, among 
the world's most important agricultural exporters. But their initiative was 
supported by a number of other nations, whose food producers and processors 
also wanted enhanced access to each others' markets, including that of the 
United States. Likewise, the restrictions on the use of food processing stan­
dards as nontariff barriers in the North American Free Trade Agreement re­
flected the interests of both Mexican and American agricultural exporters.
Moreover, the limited success of impact of NGOs in the United States, act­
ing either alone or in cooperation with producers, on restricting American ex­
ports of various "hazardous" product was largely due to the greater political 
influence of American exporters. Thus it was the opposition of the American 
chemical industry which prevented Congressional passage of the "circle of poi-
Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff and Thomas Illgen, Controlling Chemicals: The 





























































































son" legislation. And the influence of export-oriented American manufactur­
ing and service firms helped defeat proposals to "tax" imports of manufac­
tured products produced according to laxer regulatory standards.
The interests of particular firms or the structure of particular economic 
sectors is not, however, sufficient to explain the extent to which the use of na­
tional regulations as trade barriers has been constrained. For example, the de­
cision of the European Court of Justice in Cassis de Dijon can hardly be at­
tributed to the political or economic influence of the French liqueur industry, 
let alone the German alcoholic beverage importer whose complaint initiated 
the case. Moreover Cassis preceded the Single European Act, which did have 
substantial business support. And while export-oriented European firms un­
doubtedly played a critical role in the passage of the SEA, their influence does 
not adequately explain the EU's subsequent progress in reducing nontariff 
barriers for so many products in so many sectors.
The second explanation for the compatibility between trade expansion and 
protective regulation has to do with the structure and authority of international 
institutions.14 Thus the success of the EU's 1992 program owes much to the 
fact that the Community created a set of institutions, in which norms, legal 
principles and decision-making rules have significantly facilitated both the 
harmonization of national regulatory standards and the reduction of national 
protective regulations that restrict trade. In particular, the European Court of 
Justice has emerged as a powerful institution, comparable in many respects to 
the Supreme Court of the United States.15 Its articulation of the principle of 
mutual recognition, and its application of this principle to strike down numer­
ous national product regulations, have made an immeasurable contribution to 
European economic integration. Likewise, the EU's decision to establish a 
system of weighted voting for directives affecting the single market has played 
a critical role in facilitating the adoption of Union-wide regulatory standards.
Moreover, the EU's 1992 program helped change the outlook of both large 
and small firms throughout Europe. By encouraging them to think about mar­
kets in regional rather than national terms it affected the way they defined 
their interests. Instead of focusing on the maintenance of domestic regulations 
and standards that restricted imports, they increasingly began to challenge the 
regulations of other member states which limited their exports. The result was
14 This analysis parallels theories on the formation and maintenance of international re­
gimes. See International Regimes, Stephen Krasner, ed. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983; and Robert Keohane, After Hegemony Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984.
15 See Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory 




























































































to create a degree of business support that did not exist before for the idea of 
the single market and the removal of trade barriers.16
The GATT is a much weaker institution than the EU. But nonetheless it too 
has played a role in limiting the use of regulations as trade barriers. Signifi­
cantly, no GATT signatory has yet imposed a tax on imported products which 
are produced accorded to laxer environmental standards, in spite of substantial 
domestic political support for such a measure from protectionist producers 
and environmentalists in a number of countries, including the United States. 
Governments have resisted such a tax -  and domestic pressures for it -  because 
it would undermine the logic of liberalized global trade, and threaten the 
broad range of benefits provided by open markets.
The response of the international community to the decision of the 
tuna/dolphin dispute panel provides another indication of the importance of 
institutional rules. Although this panel's ailing was widely criticized on both 
environmental and legal grounds, and not officially adopted by the GATT 
Council, it nonetheless has affected a number of national policies. Even the 
United States, which chose to ignore the panel's ruling with respect to Mexican 
tuna imports, has since hesitated to impose additional trade restrictions which 
would be inconsistent with the panel ruling. Moreover, when the EU subse­
quently issued its own directive to reduce dolphin deaths caused by tuna fish­
ing methods, in deference to the ruling of the GATT dispute panel it did not 
extend its scope to non-EU owned fishing vessels. Likewise, it was the Euro­
pean Commission's unwillingness to be subject to GATT dispute settlement 
proceedings that led it to resist the pressures of the European Parliament to 
impose restrictions on imports of wood from tropical forests. Austria also 
withdrew its labeling requirement for imports of tropical wood because of 
pressure from the GATT. And the U.S. carefully structured its ban on exports 
of unprocessed logs to make it GATT consistent.
The FTA has had less impact on removing regulatory barriers to trade be­
tween the United States and Canada in part because these barriers were not 
significant to begin with. However, NAFTA is likely to play a much more im­
portant role in reducing national regulations that restrict trade in large mea­
sure because of the relative importance of existing regulatory trade barriers 
between Mexico and the United States.
The third reason why the increase in regulation has not been more disrup­
tive of trade has to do with the increasing importance of international envi­
ronmental treaties and agreements.17 These accords establish minimum, rela­
16 This analysis is consistent with the neofunctionalist explanation of European economic 
integration put forward by Ernst Haas. See Ernst Haas, The Uniting o f Europe Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958.
17 For a discussion of the increasing importance of international environmental institutions, 




























































































tively uniform regulatory standards for both products and processes, thus en­
abling nations to cooperate in addressing common environmental problems 
while preventing free-riding. They now encompass a wide range of regulatory 
policies formerly under the control of national governments, including trade 
in endangered species of both plants and animals, hazardous waste, fishing 
methods and fisheries management, the production of CFCs, sulphur emissions 
(acid rain), and the pollution of international waters. While their enforcement 
is uneven, they have established rules which have significantly contributed to 
reducing trade conflicts stemming from divergent domestic environmental 
standards and cross-national environmental spillovers.18 Although these 
treaties and agreements are most important at the international level, they have 
also played an role in the coordination of environmental standards and their 
enforcement in North America.
Finally, it is important to note that freer trade does not require that nations 
adopt uniform production standards since differences in national production 
costs are an important reason why trade occurs in the first place. Nor does it 
require that nations adopt identical product standards for traded goods. Rather 
the compatibility of trade and regulation primarily requires that national regu­
latory standards for traded products be written in such a way as to minimize 
the obstacles they impose on imports.
The Impact of Trade on Regulation
This in turn raises a second, equally important issue. What has been the im­
pact of trade liberalization and agreements to promote it on national regula­
tory standards? Has the reduction in both tariff and nontariff barriers under­
mined national efforts to protect consumers and improve the environment?
International trade as a proportion of GNP has significantly increased in ev­
ery industrial nation since the late 1960s.19 Yet during this same period, envi­
ronmental and consumer regulations have become progressively stricter. All 
industrial nations and a number of industrializing ones now devote substan­
tially more resources both in absolute and relative terms to environmental and 
consumer protection than they did in 1970.
edited by Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 1993.
18 See for example, International Environmental Diplomacy, John Carroll, ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), Global Accord Nazli Choucri, ed. (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1993), Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), and Oran Young, International Cooperation (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1989).





























































































Since the early 1970s few major economies have experienced a greater in­
crease in their exposure to international competition than that of the United 
States: between 1970 and 1980, both imports and exports as a share of GNP 
more than doubled.20 And yet American regulatory standards have become 
substantially stronger during the last quarter-century. The proportion of 
American GNP devoted to pollution control stood at 1.5% in 1972; it has been 
higher every year since, averaging more than 1.7% between 1980 and 1986 
and increasing to 2.2% in 1992.21 Annual expenditures on compliance with 
federal environmental regulations totaled $90 billion in 1990 and increased by 
approximately $30 billion following passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments.22
Similarly, across the Atlantic the Single European Act's goal of creating a 
single European market was in large measure motivated by the interests of 
European business managers and political leaders in strengthening the ability 
of European industry to compete successfully in the global economy. Yet this 
same amendment to the Treaty of Rome also authorized and has contributed to 
a significant strengthening of EU environmental and consumer regulations. 
Likewise, since the early 1970s Japan has both emerged as a major interna­
tional exporter and has significantly increased its environmental expendi­
tures.23
The compatibility between increased exposure to the global economy and 
the strengthening of domestic regulatory efforts is also borne out by the expe­
rience of Mexico, a developing nation. Since 1986, Mexico has significantly 
opened up its economy to foreign competition, while between 1988 and 1991, 
government spending on environmental protection increased ten fold.24 The 
approval of NAFTA will to re-enforce both, especially to the extent that 
Mexico's per capita GNP moves above the level at which the World Bank es­
timates that national per capita emission levels begin to decline due to an in­
crease in resources devoted to pollution control.25
20 ibid
21 Pollution Control Expenditures in Selected OECD Countries 1972-1986, Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1989, p.39.”When Green in Good," 
Economist November 20, 1993, p. 19.
22 Raymond Kopp, Paul Portney and Diane DeWitt, International Comparisons of Environ­
mental Regulations Washington D.C: Resources for the Future, 1990. p. 3.
23 See Susan Pharr and Joseph Badaracco Jr. "Coping with Crisis: Environmental Regul­
ation," in America versus Japan edited by Thomas McCraw, Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1986, pp. 229-260.
24 William Lash UI, "NAFTA and the Greening o f International Trade Policy St. Louis, 
Center for the Study of American Business, 1993, p. 11.
25 "Globerman, "Environmental Impacts of Trade Liberalization," p. 34; see also Gene 
Koretz, "A Robust Economy Can Help Cure A Sick Environment," Business Week May 




























































































The United States itself provides the clearest example of the compatibility of 
strict regulatory standards and extensive economic interdependence. As a 
union of member states, the United States itself is a highly integrated market 
whose Constitution permits few restrictions on interstate commerce, especially 
for traded goods. While many regulatory standards are set by the federal gov­
ernment, a number of federal regulatory statutes only set minimum standards. 
For example, states are permitted to enact stricter controls on automobile 
emissions than those required for the nation as a whole. States also are free to 
impose tougher standards on stationary sources of pollution and additional re­
strictions on land use. Additionally, recycling requirements are primarily set 
by state and local governments.
While states do compete with one another to attract investment, they have 
generally not chosen to do so by lowering their standards for environmental 
or consumer protection. On the contrary, many state standards are stricter 
than federal ones. A number of states have enacted more stringent controls 
over the use of pesticides, beef hormones, and CFCs than the federal govern­
ment. Several state and local governments have also established ambitious re­
cycling programs, bans on the use of specific materials in packaging and strict 
standards for solid waste disposal and incineration. A number of states also 
have established their own, stricter air pollution control standards; those im­
posed on both individuals and businesses by the Southern California Air Qual­
ity Management District are among the strictest in the world.
Nor is the United States unique. Subnational governments in other federal 
systems, including Canada and Australia, have enacted consumer and environ­
mental regulations stricter than those required by their central governments. 
Indeed, it was precisely the increasing propensity of local governments to es­
tablish their own tougher regulatory standards that led the drafters of the 
GATT Agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary standards to include a provi­
sion holding central governments responsible for the regulatory standards of 
subnational political units.
The Costs of Compliance
To be sure, some national regulatory standards have been lowered or de­
layed as a result of international competitive pressures. For example, in the 
United States the automobile emission standards of the 1977 Clean Air 
Amendments were modified by Congress as a response to the American auto­
mobile industry's competitive difficulties, while in the early 1980s automobile 
safety requirements were delayed for similar reasons.26 And in 1993, the 
German Government agreed to modify its recycling requirements following
26 David Vogel, "A Case Study of Clean Air Legislation 1976-1981," in The Impact o f the 





























































































complaints from German firms that some of these requirements were placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage. There is also growing concern in Europe 
that some Union environmental standards have reduced the international com­
petitiveness of European firms and this may well temper the EU's willingness 
to impose new regulations on industry.2?
There are undoubtedly trade-offs between international competitiveness and 
domestic expenditures mandated by protective regulations. Global competition 
does constrain domestic regulatory policies as it constrains both national fiscal 
and monetary policies. But these constraints have still left governments with 
substantial discretion to enact regulations stricter than those of their trading 
partners. Thus in spite of several cases of trade/regulation conflict, over the 
long run economic interdependence has been positively associated with the 
strengthening of regulatory standards.
Why should this be true? Why hasn't increased regional and international 
competition led regions, nations, or sub-national governments to compete with 
one another by enacting less stringent consumer and environmental regula­
tions? In other words, why don't national health, safety and environmental 
regulations exhibit the "Delaware effect?" In light of recent trends in labor 
markets, it seems puzzling that regulatory policies have not followed the same 
pattern as wages -  which have been adversely affected by increased interna­
tional competition in most industrial nations. To take one important example, 
why have real wages, fringe benefits and employment security for American 
automobile workers declined, in part due to increased international competi­
tion, while over the same time period automotive safety, emission and fuel 
economy standards have been progressively strengthened?
One important reason is that for all but a handful of industries, the costs of 
compliance with stricter regulatory standards have not been sufficient to force 
relatively affluent nations, or sub-national governments to chose between 
competitiveness and consumer or environmental protection. For in marked 
contrast to labor costs, the costs of compliance with protective regulations 
have been modest. According to Martin Houldin, the environmental director at 
the consulting firm KPMG Peat Marwick in London, "The international dif­
ferences in the cost of labor are generally so much more important that the 
environment pales into insignificance.28 This is not to say they are non-exis­
tent: many expenditures to improve environmental quality do reduce output 
and lower the rate of productivity growth. But in the aggregate increases in 
national levels of pollution-control expenditures have had little effect on the 
growth of economic output.29 Nor have American states with stronger envi­
2? Bronwen Maddox, "Black skies, red tape, green fields, grey area," Financial Times 
March 3, 1994, p. 8.
28 Maddox, "Black Skies ..." p. 8.





























































































ronmental policies experienced inferior rates of economic growth and devel­
opment.30
While production standards obviously can and do affect corporate plant lo­
cation decisions, for all but a handful of industries the effects are not signifi­
cant.31 Within the United States, differences in environmental standards have 
not been a major factor in plant siting or expansion decisions.32 Studies of in­
ternational corporate location decisions reach similar conclusions: only a rela­
tively few heavily polluting industries have shifted their production from the 
United States "mostly because pollution control expenses alone are generally 
not large enough a share of total costs to make it worth a company's while to 
relocate."33 Environmental control costs comprise less than 2 percent of total 
production cost for most US industries, even though American standards are 
relatively stringent.34
Likewise, studies of the composition of American imports and exports con­
clude that while "environmental compliance outlays have some impact on trade 
performance ... the impact is not significant for most industries."35 Signifi­
cantly, "Japan, with which the U.S. has its principal trade deficit, is not known 
for its lax environmental standards."36 The OECD reports that "very little 
evidence exists of firms being transferred abroad in order to escape the more
30 Stephen Meyer, "Environmentalism and Economic Prosperity: Testing the Environmental 
Impact Hypothesis," M.I.T. Project on Environmental Politics and Policy.
31 For a summary of the literature on environmental regulation, trade and corporate location 
decisions, see Richard Stewart, "Environmental Regulation and International Com­
petitiveness," The Yale Law Journal Vol. 102, No. 8, (June 1993) pp. 2077-2079 and 
Judith Dean, "Trade and the Environment: A Survey of the Literature," in International 
Trade and the Environment, Patrick Low, ed. Washington D.C. World Bank, 1992, pp. 
16-20. See also, Robert Lucas, David Wheeler and Hemamala Hettige, "Economic 
Development, Environmental Regulation and International Migration of Toxic Industrial 
Pollution: 1960-88" in Low, International Trade and the Environment pp. 67-86; Patrick 
Low and Alexander Yeats, "Do 'Dirty' Industries Migrate? in Low International Trade 
pp. 89-103; James A. Tobey, "The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on 
Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test," Kyklos Vol. 43, (1990) p. 191-209; Kon­
rad von Moltke, "Environmental Protection and Its Effects on Competitiveness," in 
Difficult Liaison; Trade and the Environment in the Americas edited by Heraldo Munoz 
and Robin Rosenberg, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1993, pp. 5-20.
32 See Timothy Bartik, "The effects of environmental regulation on business location in the 
United States" Growth and Change No. 19 (1988) pp. 22-44.
33 Hilary F. French, "Reconciling Trade and the Environment," State o f the World 1993, 
Linda Starke ed. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993 p. 166.
34 Stewart, "Environmental Regulation" p. 2077.
35 Stewart, "Environmental Regulation, p. 2076.
36 Charles Pearson and Robert Repetto, "Reconciling Trade and Environment: The Next 
Steps," in The Greening o f World Trade A Report to EPA from the Trade and Environ­
ment Committee of the National Advisory Council for Environmental Policy and 




























































































stringent environmental regulations at home."37 According to the OECD, the 
fears that poorer countries would "deliberately keep environmental standards 
lax in order to attract investment by becoming pollution havens has [not] ma­
terialized ... mostly because pollution control expenditures are generally not a 
large enough share of total costs to make it worth a company's while to relo­
cate."38 In fact, "multinational companies are increasingly adopting the same 
environmental standards for their plants, regardless of the country in which 
they operate."39 Accordingly, "there is no reason to suppose that international 
competition for comparative advantage will lead nations to adopt inappropri­
ately low environmental standards."40
Finally, just as industrial production often imposes public costs, so do pro­
tective regulations produce public benefits. Thus expenditures on reducing air 
pollution may increase agricultural output while improvements in water qual­
ity may result in better fishing yields or increased tourism. Equally impor­
tantly, improvements in environmental quality and product safety can improve 
the health, and thus the productivity, of a nation's work-force and thus reduce 
national health-care expenditures. They can also create opportunities for ex­
port markets for pollution-control equipment.41 In short, while the economic 
benefits of regulation are difficult to measure, and have often been exagger­
ated, they are far from inconsequential.
This does not mean that nations are free to impose whatever environmental 
regulations they wish on firms engaged in international competition. For while 
stricter environmental standards may not make a nation poorer, neither do 
they make it richer; greater wealth leads to a preference for strong regulatory 
standards, not the reverse. But the fact that laxer regulatory standards are not, 
for all but a handful of industries, an important source of competitive disad­
vantage, only helps explain why the reduction of tariff and other trade barri­
ers has not resulted in a movement toward lower regulatory standards. It does 
not explain why or how trade liberalization and agreements to promote it has 
contributed to raising them.
37 "Trade and the Environment," A draft prepared by the Trade Committee of OECD, June 
27, 1989, p. 6.
38 Hilary French, "Reconciling Trade and the Environment," State o f the World 1993, New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993, p.166.
39 Edith Brown Weiss, "Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,” Yale 
Law Journal Vol. 102, p. 2135.
40 Stewart, "Environmental Regulation," p. 2058.
41 Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage o f Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990) 
pp. 685-588. See also International Trade in Environmental Protection Equipment U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1993 and Curtis Moore and Alan Miller, Green Gold 




























































































The "California Effect" Revisited
The "Delaware effect" does apply to some public policies, but the evidence 
presented in this talk suggests that protective regulations have not usually been 
among them. On the contrary, a number of national consumer and environ­
mental regulations exhibit what can be described as the "California effect": 
they have moved in the direction of political jurisdictions with stricter regula­
tory standards.
The "California effect" can be illustrated by the history of American auto­
mobile emission standards. The 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments specifically 
permitted California the option of enacting stricter emissions standards than 
those required for the rest of the United States, an option which California 
chose. Consequently its standards remained stricter than those of any other 
state. In 1990, Congress brought national emission standards up to California's 
and once again permitted California to impose stricter standards. It also gave 
other states the option of choosing either national or California standards.42 In 
1994, 12 eastern states requested that the federal government to permit them 
to adopt California's new standards.43 These standards in turn are likely to be­
come the basis for the next round of minimum federal requirements. Califor­
nia has now had America's strictest automotive pollution control standards for 
more than three decades. Thus instead of states with laxer standards undermin­
ing those with stricter ones, in the case of automobile emissions precisely the 
opposite has occurred: California helped make American mobile emissions 
standards steadily stronger.
The term "California effect" is meant to connote a much broader phe­
nomenon than the impact of American federalism on state regulatory stan­
dards. The general pattern suggested by this term, namely the ratcheting up­
wards of regulatory standards in competing political jurisdictions, applies to 
many national regulations as well. This pattern has three components: two re­
late to market forces and the third has to do with politics. First, to the extent 
that stricter regulations represent a source of competitive advantage for do­
mestic firms, the latter may be more likely to support them. Secondly, rich 
nations which have enacted "greener" product standards force foreign produc­
ers to adjust to them in order to continue to enjoy market access, thus helping 
in turn to raise foreign product standards. Thirdly, agreements to reduce trade 
barriers can provide richer and more powerful "greener" nations with the op­
portunity to pressure other nations into adopting stricter product and produc­
tion standards.
42 Gary Bryner, Blue Skies, Green Politics, Washington D. C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Press, 1993, pp. 149-150.
43 Matthew Wald, "Harder Auto Emission Rules Agreed to by Eastern States," New York 




























































































The Interests of Domestic Producers
How can international competition turn industrial opponents of tougher 
standards into self-interested promoters of them? First, knowing or anticipat­
ing that the burdens of compliance will fall disproportionately on their inter­
national competitors may well make domestic producers more willing to sup­
port stricter regulations than they would have in the absence of foreign com­
petition. For example, the beer bottlers of both Denmark and Ontario would 
probably not have supported stricter recycling requirements had not these 
regulations also served to help protect their domestic markets. Similarly, the 
success of European consumer groups in persuading the EU to completely ban 
the use of growth hormones in beef production was facilitated by the support 
the ban received from Europe's small, relatively inefficient, but politically 
powerful cattle farmers. Likewise, Germany's willingness to support stricter 
domestic and EU standards for automobile emissions stemmed in part from the 
extent to which these standards benefited domestic producers. And the Thai 
government would not have imposed such severe restrictions on cigarette 
marketing in the absence of competition from American cigarette companies.
From this perspective, more liberal trade policies, rather than pressing na­
tions to lower their regulatory standards, may actually provide nations with an 
economic incentive for strengthening them. By contrast, since relatively closed 
economies can rely on tariffs and quotas to restrict imports, they have less 
need to adopt protective regulations that advantage domestic producers. In 
some cases, these regulations may amount to little more than disguised forms 
of protectionism. Nor do stricter standards necessarily improve consumer or 
environmental protection. Nonetheless, the self-interest of producers can play 
a role in strengthening regulatory standards for a number of internationally 
traded products. In short, Baptist-bootlegger coalitions can serve to advance 
the legitimate interests of both Baptists and bootleggers.44
The Lure of Green Markets
The second way in which international trade can drive national regulatory 
standards upward has to do with market access. The argument that trade pro­
motes the strengthening of environmental standards has primarily rested on 
the impact of trade on promoting domestic economic growth, hence increasing 
both the demand for regulation and the ability to pay for it. The evidence pre­
44 Baptist-bootlegger coalitions have also played an important role in strengthening interna­
tional environmental agreements. For example, the strong support of the United States 
for the Montreal Protocol reflected a convergence of interests between American envi­
ronmental organizations and Dupont The latter supported international restrictions on the 
production of CFCs because it was more easily able produce a substitute product than its 
European competitors, see Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy (Cambridge: 




























































































sented in this talk takes this argument another step: it demonstrates that an­
other important factor enabling greener countries to promote the export of 
stricter standards to less green countries has to do with the size and importance 
of the former's domestic markets.
Political jurisdictions which have developed stricter product standards force 
foreign producers in nations with weaker domestic standards, either to design 
products that meet those standards or sacrifice export markets. This, in turn, 
encourages those producers to make the investments required to produce these 
new products as efficiently as possible. But having made these initial invest­
ments, they now have a stake in encouraging their home markets to strengthen 
its standards as well since their exports are already meeting those standards.45
Thus the willingness of Germany's automobile manufacturers to support 
stricter EU standards was in part due to their previous experience in produc­
ing vehicles for the American market. It was precisely the firms supplying the 
largest, wealthiest automobile market in Europe who took the lead in pressur­
ing the EU to adopt the product standards already set by the world's largest, 
richest market, namely the United States. They made common cause with 
German environmentalists to demand the adoption of "US 83" standards by the 
EU. Significantly, half of German automobile sales in the United States are in 
California, the political jurisdiction with the world's strictest automotive 
emission standards.
Indeed, German producers stood to benefit from the EU's adoption of 
American standards, since they could then produce similar vehicles for both 
markets at lower costs. Likewise, the subsequent willingness of the French and 
Italian manufacturers to support the stricter standards of the Small Car Direc­
tive stemmed in part from die experience they had gained in producing cars 
for export to "greener" markets in Europe and the United States as well as 
their fear of losing additional export markets to their "greener" competitors. 
Significantly, the one European country whose bottlers welcomed Germany's 
strict packaging law was Denmark, whose producers enjoyed a competitive 
advantage in recycling their own products due to Denmark's previously en­
acted recycling legislation.
The pull of "greener" markets has also served to drive regulatory standards 
upward in North America. The expansion of trade between the United States 
and Canada following the Free Trade Agreement between the two countries 
prompted Canada in 1993 to establish automobile emission requirements simi­
lar to those imposed on vehicles sold in American three years earlier. As bar­
riers to imports of Mexican products to the United States gradually decline as 
a result of NAFTA, Mexican producers will be forced to redesign their prod­
45 This latter point is made by John Braithwaite in "Transational Regulation of the 




























































































ucts to meet American regulatory standards. And those producers who do so 
will then have an interest in pressuring the adoption of similar standards by 
Mexico, since this will provide them with a competitive advantage over their 
more domestically-oriented competitors. At the same time, American ex­
porters to Mexico may also become a source of political support for making 
Mexican regulatory standards more similar to those of the United States since 
that will enable them to design similar products for both markets.
The pattern of chemical regulation also illustrates the role of international 
trade and competition in strengthening regulatory standards. It was the enact­
ment of the Toxic Substances Control Act by the United States that prompted 
the European Union to enact the Sixth Directive. The EU feared that unless its 
standards were comparable to those of the United States, it would be deprived 
of access to one of the world's largest chemical markets. As a result it estab­
lished a much stricter system for the introduction and marketing of chemical 
products. Once again, stricter American standards drove those of its major 
trading partner upward.
In the area of conservation, both the United States and the EU have repeat­
edly used restrictions, or the threat of restrictions, on access to their large 
domestic markets to force their trading partners to upgrade their regulatory 
standards. It was the economic pressure of the EU which forced Canada to end 
its killing of baby seals and which persuaded both the United States and Canada 
to end the use of leg-traps to catch fur bearing animals. Likewise the large size 
of its domestic market has provided the United States with the leverage to in­
fluence the fishing practices of several of its trading partners thus helping to 
protect a variety of species, including whales, turtles and dolphins.
The impact of both these effects of trade liberalization is limited. Specifi­
cally, trade liberalization is most likely to encourage a nation to raise its do­
mestic regulatory standards when doing so provides domestic producers with a 
competitive advantage. This is often the case, but not always. Likewise, the 
impact of "greener" markets on promoting the export of stricter standards 
primarily applies to product standards. While this encompasses virtually all 
consumer protection regulations as well as those environmental regulations 
which apply to products, it excludes those environmental standards that seek to 
address the harms caused by how products are produced. And the latter are 
extremely significant: thus there are a number of environmental practices in 
less developed nations, ranging from deforestation to hazardous levels of ur­
ban air pollution, which are unlikely to be affect by the demands of consumers 
in "greener" markets.
This is, however, another mechanism by which trade liberalization can 
raise standards, one capable of affecting a much broader range of regulatory 




























































































The Politics of Standard Setting
To the extent that treaties or trade agreements provide formal mechanisms 
for establishing harmonized or equivalent standards, they provide an oppor­
tunity for richer, more powerful countries to play a greater role in setting 
those standards. If the world's five major trade treaties and agreements were 
ranked in terms of the extent to which their signatories have agreed to reduce 
the use of regulation as trade barriers, the most powerful would the Single 
European Act, followed by the Treaty of Rome, the North American Free 
Trade Agreement, the Free Trade Agreement and the various rounds of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. If these same five treaties and 
agreements were to be ranked in terms of the extent to which they contain 
provisions designed to either maintain or strengthen the regulatory standards 
of their signatories or members, the rankings would be identical. Paradoxi­
cally, the more authority nations concede over the making of national regula­
tory standards, the more likely these standards will be strengthened.
The reason for this relationship is not that international agreements to pro­
mote trade liberalization automatically strengthen regulatory standards; in 
principle, they can just as easily weaken them. It is politics that makes the dif­
ference. Specifically, trade agreements and treaties maintain or raise regula­
tory standards when a powerful and wealthy nation insists that they do. In 
turn, the powerful nation's willingness to demand that trade liberalization be 
accompanied by the maintenance or strengthening of health, safety and envi­
ronmental standards is in large measure due to the influence of its domestic 
NGOs, and, in many cases, its domestic producers as well. But the ability of a 
powerful nation to impose its preferences on its trading partners is also depen­
dent on the degree of integration: the more integration, the greater its influ­
ence.
Thus the most important factor driving EU environmental standards 
steadily, if unevenly, upward has been the power and preferences of Germany, 
the member state with the largest economy and Europe's most powerful envi­
ronmental movement. By strengthening the power of the Union over the regu­
latory policies of its member states, the SEA has in turn increased the leverage 
of Germany, along with the Netherlands and Denmark, over the environmen­
tal policies of the rest of the Union. The SEA could have attempted to promote 
integration at the expense of stricter consumer and environmental standards. 
That it did not do so was a reflection of the political and economic of those 
member states which wanted the Community to simultaneously achieve both 
policy objectives.
Similarly, NAFTA is a much "greener" trade agreement than the FTA for 
one simple reason: the United States insisted upon a Supplementary Agreement 
which extends international supervision over the enforcement of Mexican do­




























































































product standards. It did so primarily for one reason: powerful domestic envi­
ronmental constituencies whose support the Clinton Administration needed to 
persuade Congress to support NAFTA demanded it. But the US in turn was 
able to insist upon this condition because it was wealthier and more powerful 
than Mexico. The impact of NAFTA on Mexican regulatory policies and pref­
erences will continue to be strongly influenced by the United States, the North 
American nation with both the largest economy and the most influential envi­
ronmental pressure groups. However, because the international institutions es­
tablished by NAFTA are weaker than those of the EU, the US will have less 
influence over Mexican regulatory policies than Germany, Denmark and the 
Netherlands have had over those of Italy or Greece. But at the same time, 
NAFTA gives the United States more leverage over Mexican regulatory poli­
cies than it had under the GATT.
The frustration of environmentalists with the GATT stem in large measure 
from the extent to which GATT rules limit the ability of nations in which 
green pressure groups are especially influential from using their economic 
power to change the environmental policies of their trading partners. Accord­
ingly, "greening" the GATT essentially means increasing the ability of the 
GATT's greener signatories, primarily the United States but also the EU and a 
number of individual countries, to influence the environmental policies of 
countries with a weaker commitment to environmental protection. This how­
ever has not yet occurred. For in marked contrast to both the EU and 
NAFTA, the most powerful members of the GATT -  the US, the EU and 
Japan -  have not agreed to revise its rules so as to increase their ability to 
shape the domestic regulatory policies of other signatories. Accordingly, the 
scope of the "California effect" remains weakest at the global level. But at the 
same time, compared to both NAFTA and the EU, the GATT also has much 
less authority to weaken national regulatory standards.
International agreements and treaties to reduce the role of regulatory stan­
dards as trade barriers have constrained the ability of greener countries to es­
tablish and enforce regulatory standards as strict as their NGOs and some do­
mestic producers have preferred. But what is striking is how infrequently this 
has occurred and how little it has adversely affected consumer or environmen­
tal quality. With the partial exception of British Columbia's fish landing re­
quirements, the Free Trade Agreement between the United States and Canada 
has not required either nation to weaken its domestic regulatory policies. In 
the case of every other trade dispute, including the American restriction on 
sales of lobsters below a certain size, Puerto Rico's milk processing standards, 
the American asbestos ban and Ontario’s tax on beer cans, the nation with the 
stronger regulation was allowed to maintain it.
In the case of the GATT, dispute panels have issued decisions in only six 
cases involving the use of regulations as nontariff trade barriers. In one case, 




























































































be GATT consistent. In the case of the five other disputes that came before 
dispute settlement panels, national rules were successfully challenged. But two 
of these essentially involved commercial disputes between Canadian and 
American fishermen with few environmental consequences. In the case of the 
complaint brought by the United States against Thailand's restriction on sales 
of American cigarettes, the dispute panel found the import ban to be inconsis­
tent with the GATT, but it upheld Thailand's much more important marketing 
restrictions on all cigarettes.
This leaves the two cases involving American restrictions on imports of 
tuna, both of which were decided against the United States, along with a vari­
ety of other more informal efforts on the part of the GATT to discourage im­
port restrictions based on production standards. But the GATT's constraints 
have as much to do with the unilateral nature of these restrictions as with their 
extra-jurisdictional scope. In practice, it is highly unlikely that the newly es­
tablished World Trade Organization would uphold a complaint against an en­
vironmentally-related trade restriction that was strongly supported by both the 
United States and the European Union, let alone one taken pursuant to an in­
ternational environmental treaty. Moreover trade restrictions represents only 
one mechanism that countries can employ to influence the regulatory policies 
of other nations. They are much less effective than international environmental 
agreements, especially when the latter include subsidies.
The international institution that has played the most important role in 
limiting national environmental and consumer regulations has been the Euro­
pean Union. EU Directives have frequently prevented the Community's 
"greener" member states, most notably Germany, the Netherlands, and Den­
mark from enacting stricter regulations for traded products on the ground that 
these threaten the single market. But these "ceilings" have been more than 
counter-balanced by the Union's role in progressively strengthening the regu­
latory standards of the EU's other member states. On balance, the EU has 
strengthened both environmental and consumer standards within western Eu­
rope. Equally importantly the EU's regulatory directives cover all consumer 
and environmental standards which directly affect the health, safety or envi­
ronment of its member states and their citizens.
Moreover, any assessment of the impact of trade agreements and treaties on 
national regulatory standards must distinguish between regulations that actu­
ally protect the public and those which are actually disguised forms of protec­
tionism. Virtually all of the protective consumer regulations which have ac­
tually been eliminated or modified as a result of national obligations under an 
international agreement or treaty fall into the latter category. This is true of 
the literally thousands of food labeling and composition standards of the mem­
ber states of the EU as well those Japanese S&P standards that have been mod­
ified as a result of pressures from its trading partners. Subjecting these regu­




























































































It is true that as the authority of international institutions over national 
regulatory standards increases, so does the possibility that legitimate national 
regulatory policies will be undermined. The distinction between consumer and 
environmental protection and consumer and environmental protectionism is 
not always clear cut. Thus both NAFTA and the WTO's Agreement on Sani­
tary and Phytosanitary Standards could result in weakening some regulations 
that arguably do enhance consumer protection. But if the experience of the EU 
is any guide, on balance, they are much more likely to improve public welfare 
by forcing the elimination or modification of the large number of national 
regulations which mainly benefit producers. And if the experience of the FTA 
is any guide, national regulations that are strongly supported by both produc­
ers and NGOs are less likely to be subject to international review.
Regulation and Political Power
The argument that rich, powerful countries can drive the regulatory stan­
dards of their trading partners upward through both economic and political 
mechanisms is premised on the association between national wealth and power, 
and national preferences for stricter environmental and consumer regulations. 
The "California effect" requires both that political jurisdictions with stronger 
regulations be rich and powerful and that rich and powerful political jurisdic­
tions have stronger regulatory standards. Accordingly, it is unlikely that 
Delaware would have been able to insist on its own stricter automobile emis­
sion standards, let alone serve as a model for the rest of the United States. 
California's impact on both American and European regulatory standards is a 
function of the size of its "domestic” market.
Thus had Portugal been the EU's "greenest" member state and Germany 
been indifferent to stronger regulatory standards, the impact of the EU on Eu­
ropean environmental standards would have been rather different; they might 
well have been driven downward. A similar outcome might be expected to oc­
cur in North America if Mexican environmental pressure groups were rela­
tively strong and those in the United States relatively weak. Likewise, rela­
tively few of their trading partners would care if India or Finland, rather than 
the US or the EU, had made access to their domestic market contingent on im­
provements in the international or domestic conservation practices of their 
trading partners. Likewise, if support of Germany and the United States for 
stronger regulatory standards were to diminish, their trading partners would 
find themselves under less pressure to raise their regulatory standards.
Nor is their anything automatic about the commitment of richer countries to 
improve the regulatory standards of their trading partners. The former's 
policies preferences are dependent on the preferences of domestic constituen­
cies. For example, it is unlikely that an Asian common market or free trade 




























































































would exhibit the same pattern of regulatory policy-making that has occurred 
in Europe or is beginning to occur in North America. While Japan does have 
extremely strict domestic product standards which its trading partners have to 
meet, it has not played a leadership role in seeking to address global environ­
mental issues. Nor has it attempted to use its considerable economic and politi­
cal leverage to link Asian economic integration to the strengthening of envi­
ronmental standards in other Asian nations. Indeed, it is Japan itself which has 
been subject to pressures from its trading partners, most notably the United 
States, to improve its environmental practices, especially in the area of wildlife 
protection.4”
Accordingly, the future impact regulatory impact of an organization such as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group will primarily depend on 
whether Japan chooses to use its political and economic influence to improve 
the environmental practices of its trading partners. And this in turn will de­
pend on the preferences and political influence of Japanese environmental or­
ganizations which, to date, have been both less influential and less interested in 
environmental problems outside of their nation’s borders than their counter­
parts in the US and the EU. By like token, were China to replace the United 
States as the world's largest economy and its regulatory policies to remain un­
changed, the dynamics of global regulatory policy-making would be altered 
significantly. In sum, the impact of increased integration on regulatory stan­
dards depends on the policy objectives of powerful nations, which are largely 
determined domestically.
To date, increased economic integration has, on balance, contributed to 
strengthening national regulatory policies, especially for traded goods and in 
the case of the EC, and to a lesser extent NAFTA, for domestic production 
standards as well. Whether or not it continues to do so depends on the prefer­
ences of the world's powerful nation states. The increased integration of re­
gional and global markets in a "borderless world" has not led to a decline in 
the importance of national power. On the contrary, the globalization and re­
gionalization of regulatory policy-making has extended the influence of both 
producers and NGOs in rich and powerful countries over the regulatory poli­
cies of nations with whom they trade and with which their economies have be­
come integrated. In the final analysis, the impact of trade and trade agreements 
on regulatory standards is determined by the interaction of domestic and in­
ternational politics.
Hanns W. Maull, "Japan's Global Environmental Policies," in Andrew Hurrell and 
Benedict Kingsbury, eds. The International Politics o f the Environment, (Oxford: 
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